THE POLITICS OF BUDGETING: POWER RELATIONS IN STATE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES IN NIGERIA

Abstract

This paper critically examined how political power relations shape budgeting processes in Nigerian state government ministries. Using an exploratory research design, this study draws on existing empirical literature and reports to uncover patterns of political interference in budget processes. It reveals that powerful political actors often use their positions to influence budgetary allocations for personal or partisan advantage, thereby undermining the principles of accountability, fiscal discipline, and equitable resource distribution. Institutional oversight mechanisms, including state legislatures and audit offices, are often weak or compromised, further enabling elite dominance over public finances. Consequently, budgetary outcomes in many Nigerian states tend to reflect political priorities over developmental needs. The paper recommends a reconfiguration of budgeting institutions to foster greater professional autonomy, and citizen participation, thereby limiting elite capture and strengthening democratic accountability in state-level public finance management. 
Keywords: Budgeting, Budget Politics, Governance, Institutional Theory, Nigerian State Ministries, Power Relations, Public Finance